21 NOV 2026 — Malaysia's national computer emergency response team, MyCERT, warned on 20 November that a fake "Bantuan Laptop Percuma 2026" government aid poster circulating in WhatsApp groups is being used to take over Telegram accounts. MyCERT says the campaign is still active, having re-verified the page and its backend on 13 November.
No such programme exists. MyCERT's advisory, MA-1511.112026, says the Ministry of Finance denied it on 11 February 2026 and the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) warned against it on 27 September. The first of those denials came more than nine months before this advisory.
How the page takes the account
The poster borrows the look of an official notice, with the national coat of arms, an image of the Prime Minister at a podium and the words "100% PERCUMA DITAJA KERAJAAN", fully free and sponsored by the government. Its single link leads to a page titled "Semakan Bantuan Malaysia MADANI", styled as an aid eligibility check. MyCERT notes that the page never mentions a laptop at all.
MyCERT sets out the sequence in eight steps. In short:
- The page asks for a full name as it appears on the MyKad, a full address and a Malaysian phone number, with a note, in Malay, that an active Telegram number is needed for verification.
- Entering the number starts a genuine Telegram login. Telegram sends a five-digit login code to the victim's own app.
- The page then fetches that code from the attacker's server, fills it in and submits it by itself, so the victim "may never even read it", in MyCERT's words.
- If the account has two-step verification switched on, the page asks for the Telegram password as well.
- The attacker now holds a live session on the victim's account, and the victim sees a message, in Malay, that the application has been submitted.
- The taken-over account, along with numbers the attacker keeps for the purpose, then reposts the same poster to its contacts and groups, which is how the campaign spreads.
The third step is the unusual one. The standard advice is never to type a login code into anything except the app, but here the victim is never asked to type one. Two-step verification does not help either, because the page asks for that password too. By our reading, the protection that still works is refusing the first request: no government aid check needs a Telegram login.
MyCERT says the poster is dropped into a group by a number with Indonesia's +62 country code, often one that has only just joined through an invitation link. The advisory does not say whether those are the attacker's own staging numbers or accounts it has already taken over.
What the advisory establishes
MyCERT separates what it has confirmed from what it has inferred. It confirms that the page is a working Telegram takeover funnel and that the attacker collects names, addresses, phone numbers and accounts. Individual victims' records sit on the attacker's server and are not public, and it gives no victim count.
It also "assessed" that the same operator ran earlier waves of the same lure from August to October 2026, based on a shared page template and shared registrar and hosting clusters. It says this is "not a named attribution", and it names no one.
The advisory lists 13 domains and subdomains. By our count, four were live in the current wave: three for the lure page, all on one domain, and one for the backend that receives the stolen data. Two belong to the September and October waves, two are a rotating front and a lookalike spare, and five are earlier backends that were down when MyCERT checked on 13 November. We have not reproduced them here. Organisations that want to block them should take the list from MyCERT's advisory.
The record so far
| Date (2026) | Event, as MyCERT's advisory states it |
|---|---|
| 11 February | Ministry of Finance denies the "Bantuan Laptop Percuma" programme |
| August to October | Earlier waves, which MyCERT assesses were run by the same operator |
| 27 September | MCMC warns against the programme |
| 13 November | MyCERT re-verifies the lure page and its backend as live |
| 20 November | MyCERT publishes advisory MA-1511.112026 |
If someone has already filled it in
MyCERT tells anyone who completed the page to treat their Telegram account as taken over. Its steps are to set a new two-step verification password not used anywhere else, then end every other session from the Devices screen and look for one created around the time the form was filled in. Telegram's own FAQ describes the same two settings.
It also advises checking chats for messages the owner did not send and warning close contacts. The name, address and number should be assumed to be in the attacker's hands, so no further one-time codes for banks, e-wallets or government portals should be shared on that number. Incidents can be reported to MyCERT, and to a bank's fraud line where money is involved, with the WhatsApp screenshot kept as evidence.
MyCERT warned in June about Android banking malware spread through three different lures. That campaign used a malicious app; this one needs nothing installed, only a phone number and a code the victim may never even read.