Cyber Threat Intel 5 min read

Binance's Heist Report Traces a Fake Job Interview to Its Wallets, and Its Own Figures Shift

Binance's first account of the 29 October theft runs from a tampered installer in June to its signing service. Its recovery numbers do not match its own earlier notices.

Priya Nair
Data, AI Governance & Policy Analyst
Published 5 Nov 2026, 8:32 PM (SGT)
Share:
A person at a wooden desk on a video call with a smiling man in a suit shown on a laptop screen A person at a wooden desk on a video call with a smiling man in a suit shown on a laptop screen Photo by Tumisu on Pixabay
Advertisement

5 NOV 2026 — Binance says the record theft from its hot wallets on 29 October began with a fake job interview in September. That interview gave North Korean hackers a foothold that ran through an internal AI tool to the company's wallet signing service, according to the initial incident report it published on 3 November.

The report is Binance's first account of how the attackers got in. It also restates the size of the recovery, and those figures do not match what Binance said in its own notices over the previous four days.

A fake installer, then a fake interview

Binance describes four stages. In June, an engineer on Binance's wallet DevOps team, identified only as Engineer A, installed a tampered copy of the Homebrew package manager while trying to install "a popular AI coding tool" from a search result. Binance does not name the tool. Binance's security team caught the anomaly, replaced the machine and rotated credentials, but the report says the engineer's role and his colleagues on the wallet team were already "exposed to the hacker".

In September, Engineer B, a software engineer whose profile on a job-hunting platform mentioned Binance, was approached by someone posing as a project director. A video interview with a supposed HR representative came first, and the interviewer shared a social media account full of personal photos to build trust. In a second interview, held in a chat app, the engineer was told to download a coding "assignment" to his work computer. The code ran during setup. Binance says the malware "was not detected by the endpoint security protection tools at the time".

On 20 October, the attackers used Engineer B's computer and an internal AI tool to take control of Engineer A and a third engineer, C. They also found a container deployment token on Engineer A's machine. On 29 October, the report says, they logged on to Engineer C's computer between 17:15 and 19:56, deployed a container with Engineer A's credentials and started the theft. The report gives no time zone for that session. All other times are UTC, and if this one is too, the session closed nine minutes before the first transfer at 20:05.

Binance says its security team stopped 57 suspected North Korea-linked attempts against it during 2026. It attributes this one to North Korea on the strength of the FBI's findings.

Why closing withdrawals did not end it

The attackers used the signing service to set up delegations under Ethereum's EIP-7702 mechanism, which let a contract they controlled move assets out of a Binance hot wallet. Those authorisations lived on-chain, so suspending withdrawals did not cancel them. The wallet used multi-party computation, which meant there was "no single private key" that could quickly revoke the delegations. Binance had to build a procedure to do it.

Advertisement

The last unauthorised transfer, of 2,961.9 ETH, settled at 23:56 UTC. Binance cleared the delegation at 00:10 UTC on 30 October. By our arithmetic, the theft ran for 3 hours 51 minutes and the revocation came 4 hours 5 minutes after the first transfer. Our earlier timeline covers the freezes in that window.

Binance's recovery figures, notice by notice

Binance notice (UTC)Share covered or replenishedFrozen
Update, 30 Oct 02:23Not statedAbout US$3bn
Update #2, 30 Oct 19:33About 80%About US$3bn
Update #3, 31 Oct 14:2490%Not stated
Update #4, 1 Nov 04:08About 95%Not stated
Update #5, 2 Nov 12:45About 95%Not stated
Incident report, 3 Nov98% "as of 31 October"About US$2.85bn

Two of these do not sit together. The report says 98% of "the impacted token assets" had been replenished as of 31 October, the day Update #3 put the covered amount at 90%. Two days later, Update #5 still said about 95%. The notices measure "the impacted amount" and the report measures token assets, which may not be the same thing, but the report does not reconcile the two.

The frozen total has fallen from about US$3bn to US$2.85bn, a figure Binance calls "subject to reconciliation and market price volatility". Against its loss estimate of about US$6.34bn, that is about 45% frozen or intercepted, by our arithmetic. Binance says it will absorb the loss and that an independent review will follow.

Advertisement
Priya Nair
Data, AI Governance & Policy Analyst

Priya Nair covers AI governance, data protection, privacy, and digital trust topics for RECATOOLS.

View author profile → · Editorial policy

About this byline Priya Nair is a RECATOOLS editorial persona for AI governance, privacy, and digital trust coverage. Articles are produced and reviewed under RECATOOLS editorial supervision.

Corrections policy

Advertisement