11 NOV 2026 — Railway, the cloud hosting company, has published its full incident report on the October intrusion. By the company's count, the attacker spent close to 26 hours inside and decrypted stored secrets belonging to at most 1.85% of workspaces, or about 100,000. The report, out on 10 November, says the intruder went looking for AI provider keys and that unauthorised spending on stolen keys was estimated to reach about US$740,000.
Disclosure: RECATOOLS is written with the assistance of Claude, made by Anthropic, which Railway names among the AI providers it asked to revoke stolen keys. Readers should weigh that interest.
Railway is one of 16 developer platforms listed on a running tracker kept by the security firm Wiz, which calls the run of incidents "Black October". We went back to each company's own notice to see what each one actually admits.
Railway's 26 hours
Railway says the attack began at 07:28 UTC on 20 October, when the intruder exploited a previously unknown flaw to partly escape filesystem isolation in Railway's build system. That yielded a build credential, and through it a copy of Railway's internal monorepo. From the code, the attacker found "an erroneously defined OIDC binding configuration" in one of Railway's cloud environments, and at 03:26 UTC on 21 October obtained short-lived cloud credentials through it.
Decryption of customer variables ran from 04:42 UTC until Railway disabled the credential at 07:14 UTC, a window of two hours and 32 minutes. Railway says the attacker was "fully evicted" at 09:24 UTC. From the first exploit to eviction is 25 hours and 56 minutes, by our count from Railway's own timestamps.
Railway does not give its total number of workspaces. If 1.85% is about 100,000, the implied base is roughly 5.4 million (100,000 ÷ 0.0185), though that figure is our arithmetic and Railway calls the 1.85% an upper bound. Build histories for 353 builds were read as well, and the decrypted data included linked-account tokens for 1,852 users, all of which Railway says it reset.
Database logs show the attacker "specifically prioritizing AI provider keys". Railway says it sent revocation requests to eight vendors, among them GitHub, Anthropic, OpenAI, Google and Stripe, and that it will cover token losses itself where a provider declines to refund them. It has also filed a complaint with the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center.
Sixteen platforms, in their own words
The table sets out the 16 platforms on Wiz's list as of 10 November. Dates and descriptions come from each company's notice, not from the tracker. A RunPod incident that Wiz says was circulating only on social media is left out.
| Platform | Date the company gives | Where it said so | What it says was exposed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fireworks AI | Identified 6 Oct; update 9 Nov | Own site | Environment variables in evaluation jobs; later, billing data and some datasets and incomplete model weights |
| Andromeda | Identified 13 Oct | Own site | Andromeda and customer credentials, limited number of accounts |
| Zeabur | Incident 14-15 Oct | Own site | Environment variables in the platform database; commands run in 865 database services |
| Lightning AI | Identified 15 Oct | Own site | Customer credentials used to reach environments and connected services |
| OpenCode | 17 Oct | X post | 1.4% of OpenCode Console users |
| Railway | 21 Oct; full report 10 Nov | Own site | Variables for at most 1.85% of workspaces |
| Warp | 26 Oct | CEO's X post | A vendor in Warp's infrastructure exploited |
| Command Code | 28 Oct | X post | All API keys revoked as a precaution |
| Northflank | 30 Oct | Status page | Secrets decrypted; users report misuse of AI API keys |
| Brev (NVIDIA) | Activity 4-20 Oct | Customer notice quoted by Tom's Hardware | SSH keys, since rotated |
| Trigger.dev | 1 Nov; report 6 Nov | Own site | Environment variables, 0.66% of customers |
| Chainstack | Detected 31 Oct | Own site | Account data including password hashes; node credentials treated as exposed |
| Kernel | 4 Nov | Own site | 0.28% of customers; API keys and third-party secrets in logs |
| Blacksmith | Detected 5 Nov | X post | The system storing CI job logs |
| Tensorlake | 8 Nov | X post by Diptanu Choudhury | No impact to customer API keys or sandboxes, the post says |
| NEAR AI | Published 9 Nov | Own site | Account details of about 100 users, 18 agents, two API keys |
Ten of the 16 put a notice on their own website or status page. Five said so only on X, from a company account or an individual's. For Brev we found no public notice from NVIDIA, only a customer email quoted by the press. Four companies give a share of users hit, and all are small: kernel 0.28%, Trigger.dev 0.66%, OpenCode 1.4% and Railway at most 1.85%.
Different doors, no named attacker
No company names who was behind the attacks, and the entry points differ. Zeabur says long-lived admin credentials "were stored in plaintext", and it has announced it will shut down on 31 December, a move it calls an operational decision. NEAR AI blames a remote code execution flaw in SGLang, the open-source inference engine. Chainstack points to a third-party component. Fireworks says the evidence links its case to a financially motivated group selling stolen access to large language models, but names no group.
Wiz says "there is no single vulnerability or dependency linking these attacks". Railway, for its part, says the Wiz research "does not independently attribute the Railway incident", and that it has not established whether the intruder ran the key-resale services where stolen credentials turned up.
The harm also travels downstream. Notion told users that fewer than 1% of its workspaces may have had unattributable Notion AI chat transcripts exposed through the Fireworks incident. For anyone who stored a key on one of these platforms, Fireworks puts the fix plainly: "Removing a stored secret alone does not invalidate the underlying credential." The key has to be revoked with the provider that issued it.